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Abstract
This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of
parties using a formal model of elections. Main results show that when a party faces a
tight financial constraint the platform chosen in equilibrium is further away from its ideal
point compared to the case when the campaign expenses are not limited. Moreover, we
have shown that the platform of the party which is facing a tighter financial constraint is
further away from its ideal point than of the opponent. These results show the theoretical
foundations for the empirical observations made, about the impact of public funding of
parties on their platforms.
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1. Introduction
This work looks at the interrelation between the financial constraints and platforms
chosen by the parties competing in a two–party system. When voters vote for any of
the two candidates they not only look at the platforms offered, but are also subject to
campaign activities, which might increase the chance of voting for any party irrespective of
the chosen platforms. Therefore, the parties face a trade–off between choosing a platform
appealing to the median voter and spending resources on campaign activities. When
financial constraints are introduced on the parties, this trade–off will result in a different
choice of platforms compared to the case when the parties are unconstrained.
The most natural institutional setting, in which the parties face financial constraints is
∗Corresponding author: Phone: +43 1 361 99 61 20
1Email: monika.koeppl-turyna@agenda.austria.at
Preprint submitted to Elsevier April 29, 2015
associated with the public funding of parties. According to Austin and Tjernstro¨m (2003),
of 111 analyzed countries, public funding of parties is present in 65 countries. In only 12 of
them the public funding is equally distributed, whereas in other cases it is related to the
current (19 countries) or past (25 countries) electoral success or current representation in
the legislature (25 countries). Therefore, in the majority of the countries which actually
finance the parties from the budget, the amount of money at disposal of the parties is one
way or the other related to its past electoral performance. In this institutional environment,
a natural result is that the parties with past electoral successes will have access to higher
amount of financing then others. At the same time, in countries in which public financing
is present, parties typically face severe constraints on access to other types of financing,
and therefore private funds constitute just a small fraction of the financing obtained from
the government.
The phenomenon of the interrelation between public funding presence and choices of
platforms by the parties has been observed empirically by Ko¨ppl-Turyna (2014). Ko¨ppl-
Turyna (2014) finds that for the sample of 45 developed countries, parties tend to locate
further away from median voter when public financing is present. A natural explanation
for this phenomenon is the ”barrier to entry” created by the public financing system.
Parties with past electoral success have access to substantially higher level of financing and
therefore can remain closer to their ideal points, whereas the disadvantaged candidates,
are forced to choose divergent platforms. In this work, we attempt at analyzing this
relationship with a formal model of elections.
The theoretical literature on public funding of parties is rather scarce. Ortun˜o Ortin and
Schultz (2005) analyze a two–party model in which parties have access to public funding
assigned on the base of future electoral success. It is shown that a public funding system
increases policy convergence. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares.
If the parties have access to other means of campaign finance given in a lump-sum way,
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the effect is moderated. It is important to mention, that the authors analyze a symmetric
case.
Troumpounis (2012) analyzes using a two-party group turnout model, and compares
the effect of two types of public funding systems on parties mobilization effort and the
equilibrium turnout. Allowing one party to have a larger support than the other, the author
uncovers differences regarding the equilibrium structure: while in the unique equilibrium of
per seat funding systems both parties exert the same amount of effort, a per vote funding
system results in an asymmetric equilibrium in which the advantaged party exerts higher
effort than its opponent.
Finally, the closest work to this one is Ort´ın and Schultz (2012) who consider public
funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties’ candidates
and campaigns are informative. For symmetric equilibria, it is shown that more public
funding leads parties to chose more moderate candidates, and that an increase in the
dependence of the funding on vote shares induces further moderation and improves welfare.
If parties are asymmetric, vote–share–dependent public funding benefits the large party
and makes it moderate its candidate, while the smaller party reacts by choosing a more
extremist candidate. It is important to notice that the latter results are derived only as
numerical simulations.
This work complements the previous approaches in several ways. First of all, the cited
works concentrate on the informative aspect of campaigning, whereas we focus on the
case when campaigning has a purely persuasive effect. Second of all, we directly consider
the case of financial constraints as well as the interrelation of the constraints with other
variables in the model, such as the policy importance. Finally, although with a simpler
model then the mentioned literature, we derive analytical results in the case of asymmetric
equilibria.
This work is structured as follows. The next section presents the structure of the model.
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Section 3 describes the analytical results. Section 4 concludes. More complex derivations
are presented in the Appendix.
2. The model
The structure of the presented model is to some extent derived from the work of Herrera
et al. (2008), yet with important differences that allow to analyze the research question.
Two policy–motivated parties L and R compete in a first–past–the–post setup. Decisions of
the parties involve two components: the choice of a binding policy platform, and a choice of
campaigning efforts. The platforms l and r are simultaneously chosen in the first stage and
after observing the policy choices, the campaign efforts L and R are simultaneously chosen
in the second stage. After the platforms and campaign efforts have been announced, voting
takes place. Parties’ utility functions contain utility from obtaining the office, denoted B,
which includes gain from winning the election such as perks from office, as well as disutility
from a policy that will be implemented after the election, if it does not exactly correspond
to the parties’ ideal points. We assume that B is a lump–sum benefit, as this assumption
matches well with the first–past–the–post set–up, in which the size of the perks from office
will be less dependent on the actual margin of victory, than in a proportional representation
system. Specifically, the payoffs functions are:
UL =

B − l − L if L wins
−(1− r)− L if R wins
(1)
and
UR =

B − r −R if R wins
−(1− r)−R if L wins.
(2)
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The net payoffs include the benefits from office B, the ideological costs r and l as well as
the linear cost of campaign activities L and R.
The outcome of the election is determined by the voters, who are uniformly distributed
on a unit interval v ∈ [0, 1]. Voters’ preferences are a function of the policy distance
between their ideal points, an idiosyncratic party bias b as well as a bias towards party L
bv. The voter with an ideal point v prefers party L whenever
−a|v − l|+ b+ bv > −a|v − (1− r)|, (3)
and party R if the inequality is reversed. The idiosyncratic bias b is uniformly distributed
on [−β, β], where β will be assumed sufficiently high as not to predict with probability one
the winner of the election. The parameter a ≥ 1 in the utility of the voter measures the
importance of the policy message relative to the idiosyncratic as well as party biases, that
is it reflects the importance of the policy dimension to the voter.
The party bias bv is uniformly distributed on [−α, α], where α is assumed low enough,
so that it is impossible to predict the results of the election in advance, that is α+ 1 < β.
We model the campaign activity technology similarly to Herrera et al. (2008), yet under
the assumption of perfect targeting, in order to concentrate on the main effects. This
assumption might seem strict, but allowing for imperfect targeting does not change any
of the main conclusions and makes analytical representation of the results much more
complex. Campaign activity linearly increases the probability of winning for each party,
i.e. for party L, the final probability of winning would equal L× P (L), where P (L) is the
fraction of voters voting for L derived from (3) as explained below.
The most important assumption in our model is the fact that parties can be finan-
cially constrained. That is, we introduce parameters ΘL and ΘR, which are the financial
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constraints of parties L and R respectively. That is, in any equilibrium it holds
L ≤ ΘL
R ≤ ΘR
and we assume without loss of generality that ΘL > ΘR.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The parties simultaneously choose the positions l and r.
2. The parties simultaneously choose the level of spending L and R given the budget
constraint.
3. Nature draws bv and b.
4. Voting takes place.
From (3) it follows, that the probability that voter v favors party L equals
P (v favors L) =

P1(L) =
a+b−al−ar+β
2β
if v ∈ [0, l]
P2(L) = −avβ + a+b+al−ar+β2β if v ∈ (l, 1− r]
P3(L) =
−a+b+al+ar+β
2β
if v ∈ (1− r, 1].
(4)
Overall fraction of voters in favor of L equals
P (L) =
l∫
0
P1dv +
1−r∫
l
P2dv +
1∫
1−r
P3dv =
(b− a(l − r)(−1 + l + r) + β)
2β
. (5)
Given the linear campaigning technology, the overall probability that L wins the election
is given by
L× P (L) > R× (1− P (L)) (6)
where L,R ∈ [0, 1], or equivalently that
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b > a(l − r)(−1 + l + r) + (−L+R)β
L+R
. (7)
Denoting Fb the distribution of b, the expression above equals
1− Fb(bˆ) = 1−
a(l − r)(−1 + l + r) + α + (−L+R)β
L+R
2α
. (8)
In the second stage, the parties simultaneously choose their campaign activities level. Given
(1), (2) and (8), the expected payoffs of parties L and R are
piL =[1− Fb(bˆ)](B − l) + Fb(bˆ)(−(1− r))− L (9a)
piR =Fb(bˆ)(B − r) + [1− Fb(bˆ)](−(1− l))−R. (9b)
The corresponding Lagrange functions are
LL = piL − λ1(L−ΘL) (10a)
LR = piR − λ2(R−ΘR), (10b)
and the corresponding Kuhn–Tucker conditions are
∂LL
∂L
= 0
∂LR
∂R
= 0 (11a)
∂LL
∂λ1
≤ 0 ∂LR
∂λ2
≤ 0 (11b)
λ1(L−ΘL) = 0 λ2(R−ΘR) = 0 (11c)
λ1 ≥ 0 λ2 ≥ 0. (11d)
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3. Results
We shall analyze the possible cases in turn.
3.1. Case 1: Unconstrained solution: L∗ < ΘL and R∗ < ΘR
We will consider the unconstrained solution to serve as a benchmark for the subsequent
results. In this case, the optimal expenditure level is below the financial constraint for
both parties, that is neither constraint is binding. In this case we have
L∗ = R∗ =
β(1− l − r +B)
4α
and λ1 = λ2 = 0. If 1− l− r+B ≤ 0 the expenditure of both parties in equilibrium equals
zero, the case which will not further analyze; we assume, therefore here and throughout
the next sections that 1 − l − r + B > 0 to avoid dealing with the uninteresting corner
solutions. Otherwise, the level of expenditure is given by L∗ and R∗, the first stage first
order conditions are symmetric and the platforms chosen in equilibrium are
p∗uncons = l
∗
uncons = r
∗
uncons =
1
4
(
2 +B −
√
a (aB2 + 4α− 2β)
a
)
(12)
It is easy to see that in this case we have
∂p∗uncons
∂B
> 0
and
∂p∗uncons
∂a
Q 0,
dependent on the relation between α and β, i.e. if 2α − β > 0 then ∂p∗uncons/∂a > 0. We
conclude therefore that the relation between the platforms of parties in equilibrium and
the importance of policy compared to the stochastic components depends on the strength
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of the latter. If α + 1 < β < 2α, that is the idiosyncratic bias is not too large, parties
converge to the median along with increasing a, and the opposite holds if the condition is
not satisfied. This result is intuitive: when the policy dimension is important to the voters,
parties gain support through the movement in the direction of the median voter. If the
voters are easily impressionable, that is a is low, parties prefer to invest in the campaigning
efforts and simultaneously bear a lower policy cost. Polarization defined as 1 − r − l is
decreasing in the benefit from holding office and the effect of the policy importance is
ambiguous, as explained above.
3.2. Case 2: Constrained solution: L∗ = ΘL and R∗ = ΘR
In this case we have
λ1 = −1 + (1− l +B − r)βΘR
α(ΘL + ΘR)2
(13a)
λ2 = −1 + (1− l +B − r)βΘL
α(ΘL + ΘL)2
, (13b)
and the dual feasibility conditions place additional constraints on the parameter values.
λ2 > λ1 because ΘL > ΘR, and the necessary condition for the solution to be dually feasible
is
ΘR ≤ β(1− l − r +B)
4α
.
The first–stage solutions to the constrained problem are
l∗cons =
1
2
+
B
4
−
√
a (aB2 + 4α) (2β(ΘL −ΘR) + (aB2 + 4α) (ΘL + ΘR))
4a (aB2 + 4α) (ΘL + ΘR)
(14a)
r∗cons = l
∗
cons +
β(ΘL −ΘR)√
a (aB2 + 4α)(ΘL + ΘR)
. (14b)
Proposition 1. The platform of party L is strictly closer to its ideal point than the platform
of party R, iff ΘL −ΘR > 0.
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Figure 1: Platforms of parties for different values of a and increasing difference in budgets.
Proof. Brief inspection of (14a) reveals that r∗cons > l
∗
cons iff ΘL −ΘR > 0.
The financially advantaged party always chooses a point closer to its ideal point than
the financially disadvantaged opponent. Figure 3.2 presents simulations of the analytical
results for varying values of parameters a and ΘR.
Figure 3.2 visualizes the choices of platforms given diverse policy importance parameters
(a equals 1,2,3 or 4) as well as increasing difference in budgets: ΘR is kept fixed at 1 whereas
ΘR varies from 1 to 20. Position of party L is always depicted in solid line, position of
party R in dashed line. We can observe that when a increases, both platforms converge to
the median and the difference between them decreases. On the other opposite, for a low
value of a and a high difference in platforms, party L barely moves away from its ideal
point, and party R strongly converges.
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Replacing for l and r in the expressions of the Lagrange multipliers yields
λ1 =
√
a (aB2 + 4α)βΘR + a (BβΘR − 2α(ΘL + ΘR)2)
2aα(ΘL + ΘR)2
(15a)
λ2 =
√
a (aB2 + 4α)βΘL + a (BβΘL − 2α(ΘL + ΘR)2)
2aα(ΘL + ΘR)2
, (15b)
A sufficient condition for a solution in which both parties are constrained to be feasible is
B ≥ −β
2ΘL
2 + aα(ΘL + ΘR)
4
aβΘL(ΘL + ΘR)2
,
thus either the benefits from holding office are high enough or the policy importance is low
enough. In this case we have
∂l∗cons
∂a
=
aB2(β(ΘL −ΘR) + α(ΘL + ΘR)) + 2α(β(ΘL −ΘR) + 2α(ΘL + ΘR))
2 (a (aB2 + 4α))3/2 (ΘL + ΘR)
> 0
∂r∗cons
∂a
=
aB2(β(−ΘL + ΘR) + α(ΘL + ΘR)) + 2α(β(−ΘL + ΘR) + 2α(ΘL + ΘR))
2 (a (aB2 + 4α))3/2 (ΘL + ΘR).
The sign of the latter derivative depends on the parameters of the model; it can be shown
that as long as
α >
β(ΘL −ΘR)
ΘL + ΘR
,
r∗cons is increasing in a. Therefore, similarly to the unconstrained case, the effect of the
policy importance depends on the magnitude of the stochastic components of voters’ utility
functions. Unlike in the symmetric case, however, the advantaged party always converges
to the median voter is the policy importance is high. The disadvantaged opponent will
converge to the median along with a only if α is high comparatively to the difference in
budgets. If ΘL − ΘR is high, this condition will be correspondingly more difficult to be
satisfied: more a high difference in budgets, the disadvantaged party is likely to diverge
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from the median voter even if the policy importance is high.
Polarization is strictly decreasing in a as
∂(1− l∗cons − r∗cons)
∂a
= − α
a
√
a (aB2 + 4α)
< 0.
Polarization is also decreasing in B given the assumptions, as
∂(1− l∗cons − r∗cons)
∂B
=
1
2
(
−1 + aB√
a (aB2 + 4α)
)
< 0.
Finally, the platforms change along with the difference in budget constraints DifΘ ≡
ΘL −ΘR according to:
∂l∗cons
∂DifΘ
= −
√
a (aB2 + 4α)β
2a (aB2 + 4α) (ΘL + ΘR)
< 0
∂r∗cons
∂DifΘ
=
√
a (aB2 + 4α)β
2a (aB2 + 4α) (ΘL + ΘR)
> 0
and
∂(1− l∗cons − r∗cons)
∂DifΘ
= 0.
From the symmetry on the model follows that polarization is not changing along with the
difference in the budget available, as the changes offset each other. Yet, the difference in
the platform chosen defined r∗ − l∗ does and it holds
∂r∗cons − l∗cons
∂DifΘ
=
2βΘR√
a (aB2 + 4α)(DifΘ + 2ΘR)2
> 0,
that is the disadvantaged party R chooses a platform strictly further from its ideal point
than party L, and the difference is increasing in the difference in the budgets of the two
parties.
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Proposition 2. The platform of l∗ in the constrained case is strictly closer to the party’s
ideal point than in the unconstrained case, i.e., l∗uncons − l∗cons > 0, whereas for party R,
r∗uncons − r∗cons < 0 iff 3ΘR < ΘL.
Proof. Proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that the platform of the party with access to more financing is
closer to its ideal point than in the unconstrained case, whereas for the disadvantaged
party the result is ambiguous. The constrained platform is further away from the ideal
point of R when the difference in the budgets of the two parties is high. Consequently,
existence of a high difference in the access to financing between parties L and R generates
the result which has been observed empirically: the advantaged party can compete in
the election remaining close to its ideal points, whereas the disadvantaged party is forced
to adopt a divergent position. Therefore, not only does the disadvantaged party almost
certainly loses the election, but additionally it bears a high policy cost. We visualize this
result in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 shows, that if the difference in budgets is high, the advantaged party L
locates much closer to its ideal point compared to the unconstrained case, whereas party
R is further disadvantaged in term of policy costs: it locates further away from its ideal
point than in the unconstrained case.
Finally, analysis of the second derivatives reveals how financial advantage of one party
interacts with the parameter a describing the importance of policy for the voters. Namely,
it holds,
∂2l∗cons
∂a∂ΘL
> 0
and
∂2r∗cons
∂a∂ΘL
< 0
that is, holding ΘR constant, movement of the platform l towards the median caused by
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Figure 2: Difference between l∗uncons and l
∗
cons (blue) and r
∗
uncons and r
∗
cons (red) and increasing difference
in budgets.
the financial advantage is stronger for high values of a and the effect is opposite for the
platform r.
3.3. Case 3: L∗ unconstrained and R∗ = ΘR
An interesting case arises when one the disadvantaged party is financially constrained,
whereas the advantaged party can use the best response to the constrained opponent’s
expenditure. In this case we have
R∗Rcons = ΘR (16a)
L∗Rcons = −ΘR +
√
(1− l +B − r)αβΘR
α
(16b)
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A necessary condition that guarantees positive level of expenditure as well as dual feasibility
is
ΘR ≤ Θ¯R ≡ β(1− l +B − r)
α
.
The first–stage first order conditions are
0 =
a (1 + 3l2 +B − 2l(2 +B − r)− r2)− α + β
(
−1 + 2αΘR√
(1−l+B−r)αβΘR
)
2α
(17a)
0 =
a (1− l2 +B + 2lr − 2(2 +B)r + 3r2)− α + β − αβΘR√
(1−l+B−r)αβΘR
2α
(17b)
for L and R respectively. Solving explicitly the above system is possible but yields complex
formulas which do not provide deep insight as for direction of the effects. However, the
characteristics of the equilibrium can be analyzed. Firstly we prove that the equilibrium
exists. Thus, we show that the profits are concave in the platform choice for the admissible
parameter values.
Corollary 1. The profit functions are concave in the own choice of platforms l and r if
l∗Rcons, r
∗
Rcons ≤ 1/2 and a ≥ β4B2 .
Proof can be found in the Appendix.
Secondly, we need to show that indeed the platforms in equilibrium satisfy l∗, r∗ ≤ 1/2.
Corollary 2. In equilibrium l∗Rcons, r
∗
Rcons ≤ 1/2 if ΘR ≥ β−αβ+αΘL.
Proof can be found in the Appendix.
If the difference between the budgets of the two parties is not two big, both platforms are
lower than 1/2. In fact, the platform of the advantaged party L is always lower than 1/2 as
proven in the Appendix. On the other hand, for a very significant difference between ΘL
and ΘR the platform of party R would be on the same side of the median voter position
as party’s L. Now we can turn to the analysis of the properties of the equilibrium. First
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of all notice that since the program of party L is more relaxed, the platform chosen in
equilibrium will be closer to its ideal point, that is l∗Rcons < l
∗
cons.
Using the implicit function theorem we can analyze the impact of ΘR on the optimal
platform of party R (all expressions in the appendix):
∂r∗Rcons
∂ΘR
> 0, (18)
if a <
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8−8l+4B−8r and the value of a here determined is always positive. Similarly for
party L we have
∂l∗Rcons
∂ΘR
> 0, (19)
if a >
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8−8l+4B−8r . For any level of a, the change in the budget of party R will have
opposite effects on the platforms of L and R.
The effect of policy importance is for party L
∂l∗Rcons
∂a
> 0 (20)
iff
a >
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8− 8l + 4B − 8r
and for party R
∂r∗Rcons
∂a
> 0 (21)
iff
a <
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8− 8l + 4B − 8r .
Therefore, similarly to the expressions for the impact of ΘR, for all values of a the deriva-
tives have opposite signs: for high values of the policy importance, the platform of L
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converges to the median and platform of party R diverges; the opposite holds for low
values of a.
4. Conclusions
In this work we have presented a model of elections in which parties are financially
constrained. Main results show that when a party faces a tight financial constraint the
platform chosen in equilibrium is further away from its ideal point compared to the case
when the campaign expenses are not limited. Moreover, we have shown that the platform of
the party which is facing a tighter financial constraint is further away from its ideal point
than of the opponent. These results show the theoretical foundations for the empirical
observations made, about the impact of public funding of parties on their platforms. Some
of the results exhibit nonlinearities, which have not yet been observed in other theoretical
works on public financing. These results should be further verified by means of empirical
studies.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The difference l∗uncons − l∗cons equals
1
4
(
−
√
a (aB2 + 4α− 2β)
a
+
2β(ΘL −ΘR) + (aB2 + 4α) (ΘL + ΘR)√
a (aB2 + 4α)(ΘL + ΘR)
)
and is equal to zero iff β = 0 or β = −(aB
2+4α)(3ΘL−ΘR)(ΘL+ΘR)
2(ΘL−ΘR)2 < 0. Since l
∗
uncons − l∗cons is
increasing in β as long ΘL > ΘR it follows that the difference is positive.
It holds
r∗cons − r∗uncons > 0 if 3ΘR < ΘL and β ≤
(aB2 + 4α) (ΘL − 3ΘR)(ΘL + ΘR)
2(ΘL −ΘR)2 .
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The second condition is equivalent to β > 0 if the first condition is satisfied, therefore
3ΘR < ΘL is sufficient for the constrained solution to be further away from the ideal point
of R than the unconstrained solution.
Proof of Corollary 1. The second order conditions are:
SOCl =
2a(−2 + 3l −B + r) + α2β2ΘR2
((1−l+B−r)αβΘR)3/2
2α
(22a)
SOCr =
2a(−2 + l −B + 3r)− α2β2ΘR2
2((1−l+B−r)αβΘR)3/2
2α
(22b)
The second order condition for party R is always satisfied if l, r ≤ 1/2 and ΘR ≤ Θ¯R. For
party L we have
SOCl(Θ¯2) =
4a(−2 + 3l −B + r) + β
1−l+B−r
4α
. (23)
and since
∂SOCl
∂ΘR
=
αβ2ΘR
4((1− l +G− r)αβΘR)3/2 > 0, (24)
the second order condition is strictly increasing in ΘR. For Θ¯R the second order condition
is satisfied if
4a ≥ β
B2
(25)
for l = r = 1/2 and since the second order conditions are strictly increasing and jointly
increasing in l and r, it follows that the problem is concave.
Proof of Corollary 2. It is easy to see that platform l in this case satisfies l ≤ 1/2. Since
the problem in this case is more relaxed for party L than in case when both parties are
financially constrained, the platform chosen by L will be weakly closer to its ideal point,
than in Case 2. One can also notice that the first order condition for Case 3 evaluated at
the optimal solution to Case 2 is negative. In the case when both parties are financially
constrained l∗cons ≤ 1/2 iff ΘL > ΘR which completes the proof.
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For the platform r, we can look at the first order condition. Evaluated for any platform l
at r = 1/2 the first order condition is negative as long as ΘR ≥ β−αβ+αΘL. Since the problem
is concave for r ≤ 1/2, it follows that the optimal r∗ in this case has to be lower than
1/2.
Comparative statics of l∗Rcons, r
∗
Rcons wrt a and ΘR.
∂r∗Rcons
∂ΘR
=
(
(−1 + l −B + r)2(−2 + l −B + 3r)αβ)
/
(
(−2 + 2l −B + 2r)
√
−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR(
4a(−1 + l −B + r)2(−2 + 2l −B + 2r) +
√
−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR
))
> 0, (26)
if a <
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8−8l+4B−8r and the value of a here determined is always positive. Similarly for
party L we have
∂l∗Rcons
∂ΘR
= (−1 + l −B + r)(−4 + 3l − 2B + 5r)
√
−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR
/(−2+2l−B+2r)ΘR
(
4a(−1 + l −B + r)2(−2 + 2l −B + 2r) +
√
−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR
)
> 0,
(27)
if a >
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8−8l+4B−8r . For any level of a, the change in the budget of party R will have
opposite effects on the platforms of L and R.
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The effect of policy importance is for party L
∂l∗Rcons
∂a
=
(−4a(−1 + l −B + r)2 (−2 + 4l3 −B(3 +B) + 2l(2 +B − 2r)(2 +B − r)+
r + 4Br − (2 +B)r2 + l2(−5(2 +B) + 8r)) +(
l2 + 3(1 +B)− 2l(2 +B − 3r)− 4(2 +B)r + 5r2)√−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR) /(
2a(−2 + 2l −B + 2r)
(
4a(−1 + l −B + r)2(−2 + 2l −B + 2r) +
√
−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR
))
(28)
and for party R
∂r∗Rcons
∂a
=
(
4a(−1 + l −B + r)2 (2 + 3B +B2 − 4l(1 +B) + l2(2 +B − 4r)+
l(2 +B)r − 2(2 +B)2r − 8lr2 + 5(2 +B)r2 − 4r3)
− (l2 + 3(1 +B)− 2l(2 +B − 3r)− 4(2 +B)r + 5r2)√−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR) /(
2a(−2 + 2l −B + 2r)
(
4a(−1 + l −B + r)2(−2 + 2l −B + 2r) +
√
−(−1 + l −B + r)αβΘR
))
.
(29)
The first term is positive iff
a >
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8− 8l + 4B − 8r
and the second is positive iff
a <
√
− αβΘR
(−1+l−B+r)3
8− 8l + 4B − 8r .
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